Responses to "Consciousness and Primordial Awareness"

Use this thread to engage in dilalog regarding my short essay "Consciousness and Primordial Awareness."

P.S. I am unable to insert the text for this page from my work computer, as WetPaint is not compatible with such an outdated version of Internet Explorer. I'll try to post the article this evening.

P.S.S. OK, it's up. Let's dialog...

What an outstanding essay, Jackson! Really first rate. Thanks for posting it on this forum.

Kenneth

Jackson, you nailed it. Consciousness requires objects and is inherently a subject/object endeavor. Primordial awareness has no object other than itself.

Great work!

Thanks Kenneth and Chris!

This was a conceptual block for me for quite some time. I hope that anyone who is in the same boat will be able to read this and start to make sense of it much more quickly than it has taken me.

~Jackson

Great article Jackson !

Since you mention the objection of Nagarjuna and the teachings of the second turning of the Dharma Chakra, it is always good to back to the Prajna Paramita Hrydaya Sutra (the Heart Sutra), as it is universally accepted as an authoritative summary of the Prajnaparamita teachings on which Nagarjuna's comments are based.

The Sutra starts with:

When the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara
Was Coursing in the Deep Prajna Paramita
He Perceived That All Five Skandhas Are Empty

What is often overlooked is that the third verse expressly says 'he perceived that all five skandhas are empty'.

Logically, 'he perceived' implies that some form of '˜primordial awareness' (or whatever we might call it) perceived that the aggregate of consciousness was empty, which also validates your point of view.

My conclusion is that Nagarjuna, as well as the historical Buddha, didn't see 'anatta' or 'emptiness' as dogmatic ontological truths, but only as invaluable tools to uproot the last bits of subtle false identification, keeping in mind that '˜primordial awareness' is not and will never be an object [as such].

"
Great article Jackson !

Since you mention the objection of Nagarjuna and the teachings of the second turning of the Dharma Chakra, it is always good to back to the Prajna Paramita Hrydaya Sutra (the Heart Sutra), as it is universally accepted as an authoritative summary of the Prajnaparamita teachings on which Nagarjuna's comments are based.

The Sutra starts with:

When the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara
Was Coursing in the Deep Prajna Paramita
He Perceived That All Five Skandhas Are Empty

What is often overlooked is that the third verse expressly says 'he perceived that all five skandhas are empty'.

Logically, 'he perceived' implies that some form of '˜primordial awareness' (or whatever we might call it) perceived that the aggregate of consciousness was empty, which also validates your point of view.

My conclusion is that Nagarjuna, as well as the historical Buddha, didn't see 'anatta' or 'emptiness' as dogmatic ontological truths, but only as invaluable tools to uproot the last bits of subtle false identification, keeping in mind that '˜primordial awareness' is not and will never be an object [as such].



"

Alex, you are my Mahayana hero! Thank you for posting this

I think you're right. This may also explain why the Tibetans say that the more intellectually inclined practitioners do well with the Second Turning (Madhyamika - "empty of self") teachings as a path to enlightenment, and that those more inclined to experiential pointers may do better with Third Turning (Buddha Nature - "empty of other") teachings. For, it is really easy for most (including myself) to overlook exegetical subtleties like the one you pointed out.

~Jackson

The reason people (by "people" I'm pointing mainly to we vipassana practitioners) get confused is that we are told "everything is subject to the three characteristics." Which is, of course, true as regards all objects you encounter... until you encounter a certain POV. Primordial awareness just IS. Period. As far as I can tell, it is the veritable definition of timelessness, so any reference to time of any sort is meaningless in regard to it. So I understand Jackson's confusion. I was confused about this for a while, too. Since primordial awareness is not an object it just doesn't adhere to the doctrine of the three characteristics.

Edit for spelling.

"
The reason people (by "people" I'm pointing mainly to we vipassana practitioners) get confused is that we are told "everything is subject to the three characteristics." Which is, of course, true as regards all object you encounter... until you encounter a certain POV. Primordial awareness just IS. Period. As far as I can tell, it is the veritable definition of timelessness, so any reference to time of any sort is meaningless in regard to it. So I understand Jackson's confusion. I was confused about this for a while, too. Since primordial awareness is not an object it just doesn't adhere to the doctrine of the three characteristics.

"

That's right And the issue is two-fold.

First, as you said, vipassana practitioners are told "Everything is subject to the Three Characteristics... EVERYTHING!"

Next, there is a fundamental misunderstanding of what "consciousness" means in the context of the five skandhas (aggregates). In the West, we tend to equate being "conscious" to being "awake", and thus always equate consciousness with knowing or being aware. But a deeper look into what consciousness actually means in the context of the five skandhas reveals that it isn't simply "knowing". But rather, the phenomenal experience which arises due to a sense object meeting a sense door. All experience of conditioned objects is consciousness, and that experience comes and goes.

But what is left when consciousness passes away? It is this line of inquiry that leads to the recognition of the all-pervasive ground luminosity that is not born and does not die. And it knows itself; i.e. formless knowing which is aware of its own formless knowing-ness. Paradoxical, yes, but experientially and philosophically verifiable.

~Jackson

Yes, excellent point about the definition of the word "consciousness." That's clearly why you read the Buddha saying things like "ear consciousness, eye consciousness," and so on. The definition of the term is tied to the sense doors.

Amazing article Jackson, thanks so much for sharing it.

Do you see any fundamental difference between consciousness and awareness? I mean, as you point out, consciousness has an object while awareness doesn't, but beyond that, do you see them as separate things or different expressions of the same thing?

Would it be fair to say that when awareness is "caught" by an object, it "becomes" consciousness? Or is there more a line drawn between the two, experientially?

"Amazing article Jackson, thanks so much for sharing it.

Do you see any fundamental difference between consciousness and awareness? I mean, as you point out, consciousness has an object while awareness doesn't, but beyond that, do you see them as separate things or different expressions of the same thing?

Would it be fair to say that when awareness is "caught" by an object, it "becomes" consciousness? Or is there more a line drawn between the two, experientially?"

Hi Ian. Thanks for dropping by.

'Consciousness', as I have attempted to explain it, is the compound product of a sense-door/sense-organ interaction. When the two come together, consciousness arises. When the two are no longer in contact, consciousness ceases. I like to use sound as an example. If I play my guitar in a sound proof room, so that the sound waves can't leave the room, the sound waves (objects) will not make contact with anyone's sense-organs (ears, in this case) other than my own. My experience of "hearing" is consciousness. Hearing won't occur for someone outside the room, and thus consciousness will not occur. Make sense?

(continued below)

(continued from above)

Primordial awareness is the original wakefulness inherent in all things and in every moment (as it is, in fact, THE moment). It is that awareness which is still present even when consciousness is not. And not being dependent on objects, it simply is ever-aware of its own wakeful nature. What's great is that this wakefulness can be recognized even while moments of transitory consciousness are arising and passing. It is this inherent natural wakefulness that makes consciousness possible, and is thus distinguishable from consciousness, but ultimately in nondual relationship with it. It is, as they say in Zen, your "original face," and also, "the sound of one hand."

That's a whole lot of words for such an amazingly simple, yet unspeakably profound experiential reality. I only hope to point others in the direction of recognizing awareness, as it is the birth right of every sentient being.

Does that answer you question? If not, we can keep going with it.

~Jackson

The use of the word "consciousness" in this context strikes me as unfortunate as it is bound to lead to unnecessary confusion. The technical notion of the word being used here is at direct odds with some of the more popular colloquial usages of the word "consciousness". It seems like there already exist technical terms that get at what is being referred to here as "consciousness" without the unnecessary confusion, e.g. "phenomenal contents" or "phenomenal objects" or "qualia", etc.

Another potential point of confusion is the emphasis on sense door/sense organ. Mental imagery, for instance, is a kind of visual phenomenology ("eye-consciousness") that doesn't require visual input to the eyes. Sensory input is not a necessary condition for phenomenal contents.

"Another potential point of confusion is the emphasis on sense door/sense organ. Mental imagery, for instance, is a kind of visual phenomenology ("eye-consciousness") that doesn't require visual input to the eyes. Sensory input is not a necessary condition for phenomenal contents. "

That's a good point. But the types of phenomena which you are describing fall under the general category of "mind objects" or "thoughts", even though they manifest in more or less auditory or visual ways. Since the objects arise within mind, and thus make contact with mind, "mind-consciousness" arises as a result. Tricky, but explainable.

"The use of the word "consciousness" in this context strikes me as unfortunate as it is bound to lead to unnecessary confusion. The technical notion of the word being used here is at direct odds with some of the more popular colloquial usages of the word "consciousness". It seems like there already exist technical terms that get at what is being referred to here as "consciousness" without the unnecessary confusion, e.g. "phenomenal contents" or "phenomenal objects" or "qualia", etc."

The reason for this is that the meaning of consciousness (Pali: or viññāna) as a skandha (or aggregate) is itself at odds with the more "popular colloquial" usages of the word. This is what leads to such confusion in the first place, and is thus one of the main reasons I decided to explore this issue and publish my preliminary findings.

Thanks for the explanation Jackson. I think this does clear up my understanding a bit, though if I would like to ask one more question. You say:

"It is this inherent natural wakefulness that makes consciousness possible, and is thus distinguishable from consciousness, but ultimately in nondual relationship with it."

I can understand that awareness makes consciousness possible, but is still distinguishable from it. I guess my question is, would it be fair to say that awareness includes but transcends consciousness, although sort in a reverse way? That is, that awareness comes first, and that consciousness arises out of awareness, but is not other than awareness, simply a part of awareness (so to speak)?

And in response to Brian's point, I've always found it strange that early Buddhism described the mind as simply another sense organ, and thoughts as its related sense-objects. Strange, because this suggests something profoundly at odds with our current viewpoint in the west.

Mind being another sense door, with thoughts as its sense objects, means that thoughts come from somewhere and go somewhere, but that they are always external to the self.

Of course, in the west, we have the five sense, and objects can be seen as existing within those 5 sense realms. To rehash Jackson's guitar analogy, we hear the music, and we see the guitar. Perhaps we feel the air vibrate if the volume is up high enough. And all these things we attribute to coming from the guitar.

But whatever thoughts the guitar brings up, we see as coming from us, not from the guitar. This points to a blindness in western culture that (perhaps?) was not even considered worth mentioning back 2500 years ago. Very strange.

Anyway, I am enjoying this discussion but have to leave the office now. I likely won't be back until tomorrow... Hate to think I'm missing the chance to contribute!

"
Do you see any fundamental difference between consciousness and awareness? I mean, as you point out, consciousness has an object while awareness doesn't, but beyond that, do you see them as separate things or different expressions of the same thing?

Would it be fair to say that when awareness is "caught" by an object, it "becomes" consciousness? Or is there more a line drawn between the two, experientially?"

During recent meditation sessions, it felt as if my real identity was an unfathomable void containing the totality of experience within itself. A strange sensation of being both in and out of the game, as if the objective waking world was nothing more than a dream taking place within this void. But this dream was also the only reality, as an expression of suchness.

I would then tend to assume that Awareness gives birth to consciousness within itself, thus creating the illusion of an observer, exactly like a dream yet much more stable.

"During recent meditation sessions, it felt as if my real identity was an unfathomable void containing the totality of experience within itself. A strange sensation of being both in and out of the game, as if the objective waking world was nothing more than a dream taking place within this void. But this dream was also the only reality, as an expression of suchness.

I would then tend to assume that Awareness gives birth to consciousness within itself, thus creating the illusion of an observer, exactly like a dream yet much more stable.
"

Bingo!

I get lost right here, at the second sentence in the paragraph:

"Now, because consciousness is a kind of 'knowing', there are those who think that any experience of knowing must be accompanied by physical sensations. For this reason, any awareness (or 'knowing') that persists independent of arising and passing phenomena (but not separate from them) is rejected by the anyone who associates all types of knowing with 'consciousness' as described above."

No matter how many times I read it, I get lost. And then the rest means very little. Any way to go a little slower here for the slower people?

Plus, is this more fodder for the "controversy?"

"Any way to go a little slower here for the slower people?"

I have heard a few teachers describe it as "the thing which is not a thing" or "there's no thing looking: looking is looking"

But I'm with you Mike, honestly I'm not really sure what to make of it.

"That's a good point. But the types of phenomena which you are describing fall under the general category of "mind objects" or "thoughts", even though they manifest in more or less auditory or visual ways. Since the objects arise within mind, and thus make contact with mind, "mind-consciousness" arises as a result. Tricky, but explainable."

What about...

- visual hallucinations?
- visual after-images?
- phosphenes? (close your eyes and press on them with the fingers-- visual phenomenology)
- visual phenomenology during dreaming?
- electrical stimulation of the visual cortex?

These are all also examples of visual phenomenology without corresponding visual input into the eyes.
You could call all these "mind objects" as well, but then what's to stop one from calling normal visual experience a mind object as well? Similar considerations apply to other modalities of experience as well. On reflection, there doesn't seem to be anything especially privileged or special about how a phenomenal content is generated. The most natural delineation, rather, seems to be in modalities of experience-- visual, auditory, etc. A content in a given modality can be generated in many different kinds of ways.

"I have heard a few teachers describe it as "the thing which is not a thing" or "there's no thing looking: looking is looking"

But I'm with you Mike, honestly I'm not really sure what to make of it."

I wish I didn"t have to admit that I don't get it.
I think the gist may be that apart from "conscious of" there is some other consciousness as long as you aren't Theravadan?

Hi Mike,

That first sentence isn't worded quite right, so I may have to revise it. It should say something like this: "Now, because consciousness is a kind of 'knowing', there are those who think that any experience of knowing must arise dependent upon conditioned objects." That is to say, since 'consciousness' only arises as a condition of arising phenomena, some people think that all forms of knowing must arise due to conditioned phenomena.

So then, the view that there is an awareness that is not dependent upon conditioned phenomena is antithetical to the position stated above. Are we tracking?

But there is an awareness that exists independent of conditions. But how can we know this awareness? How is it that awareness can be without a conditioned object?

The answer: because this awareness takes as its object the Unconditioned, as it is not other than the Unconditioned. Put simply, it knows itself. Consciousness may arise and pass, but this primordial awareness does not. As the unconditioned is naturally and spontaneously luminous, it was never born and will never die, and its self-awareness never goes out. It is your own true nature, your own original face. And this awareness can be recognized, and that in itself is awakening.

But this truth is denied by anyone who cannot recognize the difference between ever-present, timeless awareness as such, and momentary, transient consciousness. I think a major reason for this misunderstanding is that 'consciousness' isn't usually understood within it's proper context.

And yes, this is definitely fodder for the "controversy."

"What about...

- visual hallucinations?
- visual after-images?
- phosphenes? (close your eyes and press on them with the fingers-- visual phenomenology)
- visual phenomenology during dreaming?
- electrical stimulation of the visual cortex?

These are all also examples of visual phenomenology without corresponding visual input into the eyes.
You could call all these "mind objects" as well, but then what's to stop one from calling normal visual experience a mind object as well? Similar considerations apply to other modalities of experience as well. On reflection, there doesn't seem to be anything especially privileged or special about how a phenomenal content is generated. The most natural delineation, rather, seems to be in modalities of experience-- visual, auditory, etc. A content in a given modality can be generated in many different kinds of ways."

It would seem to me that regardless of the source of conditioned phenomena, it must always arise, and must always make contact with a "sense organ" (of whatever kind) in order for consciousness to arise as well. Going into detail about every which way a conditioned object may arise seems superfluous to the argument... or am I missing something?

~Jackson

"It would seem to me that regardless of the source of conditioned phenomena, it must always arise, and must always make contact with a "sense organ" (of whatever kind) in order for consciousness to arise as well. Going into detail about every which way a conditioned object may arise seems superfluous to the argument... or am I missing something?

~Jackson"

It doesn't seem necessary for there to be a sense organ involved. For instance, an experience in the visual field can arise from direct stimulation of the visual cortex (which is, of course, the same thing sensory input to the eyes does-- stimulates the visual cortex). You could proceed to call the visual cortex a sense organ, but then the term "sense organ" is being used in a way not faithful to the original sense of the term, and so it might be helpful to use a less ambiguous terminology.

My point isn't to enumerate the ways in which phenomenal contents can arise, but rather to analyze and clarify the provided definition of "consciousness": "Consciousness arises when an object arises and makes contact with a particular sense organ."